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The Ethicized and Public Dimensions of Work
Alexandra Bidet and Frédérique Chave
 
Introduction
1 Is there any reason to advocate for a new momentum in the “practice turn”? In this
paper, it is argued that the practice turn, already much inspired, directly and indirectly,
by pragmatist philosophers,  namely Dewey and Mead, could be enhanced by drawing
even  more  upon  pragmatism.  Such  a  practice  turn  is  underway  in  social  sciences
(Schatzki  & Knorr  Cetina  2001;  Joseph 2004),  including sections  of  economics  (Khalil
2003a,  b),  and anthropology  (Brereton 2009).  It  is  also  widespread within  the  trans-
disciplinary  fields  of  Workplace  Studies  (Heath  &  Luff  2000;  Quéré  &  Terzi  2011;
Emirbayer & Maynard 2011), Organization Studies (Simpson 2009), Practice-based Studies
(Gherardi  2006;  Nicolini  et  al. 2003),  Science  and  Technology  Studies,  Ergonomy and
Activity  Theory  (Norros  2004;  Barbier  2012),  Communication  Studies  (Bergman 2007;
Craig 2007; Perry 2001; Russill 2008), and Games Studies (Deen 2011; Nardi 2010; Boutet
2012), to name but a few.
2 Our purpose will not be to take a global stand on these multiple strands of research, or to
determine the extent to which each draw upon a pragmatist perspective, beyond the
mere fact that pragmatism: “is derived from the same Greek word, pragma, meaning
action, from which our words practical and practice come” (James 1907). We will either
concentrate on the claim that drawing more on Dewey’s transactional view might foster
our current understandings and approaches to work and its social dramas, especially in
our so-called “knowledge-based,” “digital,” “experimental” and “cosmopolitan” society.
It is worth noting that Dewey already had an early impact upon initial bodies of research
on work, through scholars like Hughes, Roy, Goffman, Garfinkel, Strauss, Schön, Becker,
and, more recently, Vygotsky. However, until today, the pragmatists’ proper contribution
has not been properly delineated in this area,  but more or less mingled with that of
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symbolic  interactionism,  if  not  merged  into  a  broadly  constructivist  approach.  In
addition, when a more specific current is outlined, it is more likely to be termed “situated
action” or “methodological  situationism” (Knorr-Cetina 1988;  Quéré 1997).  We depart
from this  tendency by  suggesting  that  Dewey’s  transactional  perspective  furnishes  a
distinct and significant move in the direction of studies of work. Its distinctive value
needs to be illuminated. It enlightens both the ethicized and the public nature of work.
3 We begin with the view that focal cooperation activities have been an overriding concern
among interactionist scholars. We contend this framework can be broadened by following
Dewey’s proposal to shift in vision from interaction to transaction. This helps to take into
consideration  a  wide  range  of  neglected  but  common  situations,  joint  actions,  and
temporal processes. In particular, we show how the transactional view can foster the
understanding both of the most intimate at work – its ethicizing, its moral network and
personal  styles  –  and  of  the  most  public at  work  –  its  public  images  and  public
perspectives.  We will  end up considering the significance of  these  moves  to  explore
today’s work dramas and to meet the need to renew our images of work.
 
Cooperation, or the Need for Mutual Intelligibility
The intelligence of the situation is neither
individual nor collective, it doesn’t always imply
mutual acknowledgement: the intelligence of work
situations, for those who participate, thus grows,
not because they converge toward a contract, but
as networks, more or less connected and thick and
as ‘chains of cooperation’ building work’s space-
and-time consistency. (Joseph 1994: 578)
4 First, we shall recall that the very notion of interaction is at the core of major sociological
approaches, to work for instance, that focus upon symbolic and linguistic constructions.
Accordingly, scholars have accounted for cooperative interaction and shared perspectives
in the making, be it through conversations, inquiries concerning each other’s intentions,
accountability, or gestures and co-presence. The basic line is derived from, or echoes, the
Meadian  assertion  that  communication  and  mutually  coordinated  action  arise  from
projecting ourselves imaginatively into the perspectives of others – beginning with the
famous “conversation of gestures.”
5 What persists in the sociological literature from the pragmatists of the beginning of the
20th century revolves mainly around a question: how to cooperate? And an answer: the
study of the operations producing mutual intelligence between participants. As regards
work and, more widely, purposeful cooperative activities, no other subject has attracted
such  interest.  How  do  participants  manage  to  coordinate  and  so  overcome  the
heterogeneity of their respective perspectives (Bechky 2003; Katz 2002)?
6 In his description of an air traffic control tower, Goodwin (1996: 89) writes that: 
[…] what one finds in this Panopticon is not a single master view, but instead a
heterogeneous  collection  of  disparate  views  provided  by  the  different  tools  for
perception that happen to be available.
7 Building upon Goffman’s framing perspective, Joseph states that any work context: 
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[…] must be conceived as a patchwork of different participative frames in which
agents  engage  according  to  various  modalities,  in  front  of,  and  for,  different
audiences. (1994: 573)
8 It is up to the sociologist to study how “cooperation protocols” are built and constantly
rebuilt in the course of action. As there is no “pertinence by convention” (Joseph & Quéré
1993), the management of the interaction order looks like an undefined labour without
which work could not be accomplished. What prevails is how cooperation can be made
possible.
9 For work teams as for agent-user couples, co-production of goods or services is hence
approached  as  that  of  more  or  less  common  perspectives,  “a  mutual  visibility  of
situations,  gestures  and  operations  in  the  workplace”  (Quéré  2000:  166),  “concerted
appearances” (Joseph 1998),  or “shared context” (Salembier & Zouinar 2004;  Grosjean
2005). As Goodwin shows, ground air traffic controllers who are “continuously faced with
the task of juxtaposing perspectives on whatever object is being worked on, so as to
situate it within a relevant web of meaning” (1996: 89), do manage to align or articulate
their views. On the contrary, the users/supervision agents of the regional train (R.E.R. A)
studied by Joseph do not. The mere possibility of a direct interaction with users is lacking.
Yet it is clear that, if the informant could just see how crowded people on the platform
react to announcements, he could address a precise audience and observe how people
turn and move. He could consider the event (or incident) as mutually intelligible and
evaluate the relevance of his action (Joseph 1994: 583). Social interaction thus appears as
a major support for coordination. More precisely, it is a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for the juxtaposition of the different participants’ perspectives and for residual
elements of culture to be shared (Gumperz 1989).
10 This sharing may demand inquiry, as when the work of publication and accountability of
reciprocal intentions fails. Or it may work simply by using the resources of co-presence or
“conversation of gestures” (Mead 1934: 42-3). Studying public scenes of mutual assistance
between users  of  ticketing machines in train stations,  Breviglieri  describes a  gesture
“adjusted to a minimal form of mutual understanding,” implying production of a shared
reading of the events, an incidental proximity between partners (Breviglieri 1997: 144). It
requires the interface of the ticketing machines as a field in common and goes through: 
[…]  sharing  of  attention,  reciprocal  understanding  of  contextual  elements,
solicitation and raising awareness  of  a  participant,  intervention by itself,  which
furtive and spontaneous nature will show crucial. (Breviglieri 1997: 124, 127)
11 Civilities, in these situations (showing tolerance, supporting action…): “facilitate mutual
intelligibility of incidental elements and support correctness in public,  if  action fails”
(Breviglieri 1997: 124, 127). As the use of verbal language is scarce, building proximity
there is rather a matter of rhythms. The felicity of the assistance gesture, and even its
mere existence,  depend upon the professionals’  capacity to join the hesitant  rhythm
following an unsuccessful use of the interface. Besides, moments of inquiry after users’
needs and information to detect the origin of the disappointment with the machine, what
is  crucial  for  assistance  to  occur,  pertains  to  a  form of  tact:  “mostly  based  on  the
adjustment of the helping participant to the rhythm of the actor leading his purchasing”
(Breviglieri 1997: 143). Without this mutual adjustment, where the practical movement of
an actor extends that of the other actor, the attempt at assistance may be considered to
be a tiresome interference and twice as uncivil, the user being suspected of disability and
the helper of pursuing their own interests.
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12 Further into work situations, Breviglieri also studies the professional tact of agents in a
Parisian social emergency centre (Samusocial), who daily meet homeless people in public
spaces. Here too, minimal mutual intelligibility is associated with an adjustment of the
professionals to the user’s rhythm. Professionals follow at the homeless person’s pace,
imperceptibly leading them towards the bus when they: “feel, in his absence of resistance
to accompaniment, an inclination to agree to go to an emergency shelter” (2010). The
professionals “avoid embracing him to carry him but, rather, provide, as he makes efforts
on his own, quiet support like soft pushes to help him keep his balance,” as if a rhythmic
adjustment  was  a  prerequisite  for  an  interaction  that  would  surpass  hand-to-hand
assistance  to  become  more  verbal  (Breviglieri  2010).  For  Kendon,  who  follows  a
Goffmanian tradition that inclines towards behaviourism, shared rhythm is what attests
to  the  success  of  the  interaction.  Through  their  “rhythmic  coordination”  or  their
“interactional synchrony”: “participants show that they share the same perspective on
the interaction” (1990: 256). Reading Goffman from a more phenomenological standpoint,
Katz accords the body a key role in the way we interact. His study of emotions shows how
agreement with the others and with the environment is, in such emotional moments,
constantly recreated through body movements,  be they as thin as weeping,  moaning
modulations, or the intonations of laughter (1999).
13 These  examples  show in  different  ways  how mutual  intelligibility  can  be  central  to
cooperative activity studies.  This approach finds so many supports in the pragmatist
tradition that one could merge it with symbolic interactionism, the field which has most
developed those aspects, and with approaches that takes inspiration from it or extend it.
More specifically, in James,’ Mead’s, and Schutz’s work, mutual intelligibility is crucial. At
first  sight,  cooperative activity  studies  could  then  rely  entirely  on  the  notion  of
interaction to address their practical problems of coordination. As Russill puts it: 
[…]  how can two minds know one thing? For James, to say that any two thoughts or
things are strictly identical is nonsense (in the sense of silly) and to say that anyone
’s  thought  or  thing  is  identical  to  itself  is  nonsensical  (in  the  sense  of  saying
nothing at all). The question only arises as a significant philosophical concern if the
functional distinction between subject-object is mistaken for an ontological dualism
that must be definitively bridged. But such concerns, when they arise, are practical
problems of coordinating our activities in the world rather than apprehending a
rational foundation upon which our activities take place. (2008: 289-90)
14 For Mead, language, and more precisely, symbol, are the most common responses to these
practical issues: 
We always assume that the symbol we use is one which will call out in the other
person the same response, provided it is a part of his mechanism of conduct. (Mead
1934: 147)
15 Hence Mead builds the foundations of the programme of symbolic interactionism. It links
communication and thought,  claiming that “the language process is  essential  for the
development of  the self”  (Mead 1934:  135).  Nevertheless,  as  he puts:  “another set  of
background factors in the genesis of the self is represented in the activities of play and
the game” (149), so that positions answer positions, without any symbolic mediation, and
without  excluding  a  certain  form  of  mutual  understanding.  This  open  field  of  an
interactionism that is not symbolic __ which is limited, in Mead’s work, to the genesis of
the  self  __ is  actually  not  restricted  to  childhood,  but  to  a  “pre-individual”  order,
according to Simondon’s expression (Bidet, Macé 2011), which is also available to adults
in order to build cooperation, when sharing perspectives would be too costly.
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16 But it  is  Schütz who associated most  clearly interactional  dynamics with the idea of
bridging  heterogeneous  perspectives  and  actors  building  a  common  space  together.
Trying  to  understand  how  emerges  a  shared  frame  of  interaction  __ thus  a  stable,
objectively recurrent, and inter-subjectively shared reality __ he considers reciprocity to
be the fundamental form of any social relations. Reciprocity of perspectives is here a
postulate and a presumption.  Participants  assume that  their  lived experiences would
more or less be the same were they to exchange their respective positions. As Cefaï (1998:
82) reminds us:
[…] reciprocity of perspectives and simultaneity of durations are (for Schütz) but a
never accomplished and never accomplishable idealization, and the space between
standpoints  or  the gap between the structures  of  relevance imposes  a  series  of
interpretation exercises, in the relationship between Ego and Alter Ego.
17 What animates interaction, here more than ever considered as an inter-individual, if not
inter-subjective, relationship, is the ability to take the Other’s standpoint. As Simpson
(2009) shows, using Mead, the notion of transaction appears as a deepening of the notion
of interaction. Unlike symbolic interactionism, the notion of transaction, according to
Simpson, does not stress the sharing of meanings between individuals, but emphasizes
the in-the-making-creation of  new meanings between individuals.  What makes sense,
then,  is  their transformation and their new links to their environment.  Dewey,  after
having  used  both  terms  interchangeably  until  the  1940s,  states  that:  “the  word
‘interaction’ is dangerous because we may easily induce the pre-established existence of
two or  more  beings”  (Dewey & Bentley  1964:  115).  On  the  contrary,  the  continuous
transactions between an organism and its environment transform them all. Experience
refers to this establishment of a: “felt relationship between doing and undergoing as the
organism and environment interact” (Dewey 2005a).  New meanings here are not just
made of shared symbols: as “what is done and what is undergone are thus reciprocally,
cumulatively, and continuously instrumental to each other,” writes Dewey (2005a: 52),
“the scope and content of the relations measure the significant content of an experience”
(Dewey,  2005a:  46).  So  that  the  “development  of  active  lines  of  interest”  implies  a
correlative and continuous transformation of both parts.
18 The  transactional  view  extends  the  pragmatist  tradition’s  fecundity  beyond  the
production of mutual intelligibility in order to examine also work as experience. It has
gained a large audience among scholars in various fields.
 
From Interaction to Transaction: The Pragmatist
Stance Applied to Work
19 The pragmatist stance is key to ecological approaches in social sciences, those which do
not focus upon individuals or constituted environment but on the connection between
them, that is, the continuous flux of interactions that ties them together and through
which they constitute and transform constantly. As Simpson puts it, these approaches
renew the question of agency and of temporality:  on the one hand, action cannot be
associated  with  individual,  environment,  context,  or  subject.  On  the  other  hand,  a
situation in the making cannot be cut into several moments. The broad assumption that
no organism can exist but for active and creative connections with its environment, that
we do not only live in an environment but by it (Joas 1993), has already drawn attention
to  this  constitutive  relationship.  “Agency  is  not  an  attribute  but  the  ongoing
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reconfiguring of the world” (Barad 2003: 818); “it resides neither in us nor in our artifacts
but in our intra-actions” (Suchman 2007: 285). Within the Practice Turn, Suchman suggests
replacing  the  expression  “human-machine  interface”  with  “human-machine
interchange” in order to rethink how we relate to our machines (Suchman 2007: 285).
Part  of  the  school  of  research  “Embodied  Interaction,”  Dourish  also  views  our
interactions  with  “the  things  themselves”  as  the  most  deserving  subject  matter  for
research  into:  “the  creation,  manipulation  and  sharing  of  meanings  through  the
commitment to interact with artifacts” (Dourish 2001).
20 Here the pragmatist perspective intersects with French technical anthropology (Leroi-
Gourhan 1943; Leroi-Gourhan 1964; Goody 1979). By granting a sociological dignity equal
to that of cooperation between people to our relationships with the environment, by
integrating the realm of technical objects into the culture, it questions the ontological
primacy accorded to the constituted individual, and discards a substantial conception of
the individual “homo clausus,” as Elias terms it, who sees action only through the “tragedy
of choice,” that is, the simple communication of pre-existing substances. Prioritizing the
individuation process over the constituted individual allows us: 
[…] to look for a sense of values elsewhere than in the limited inwardness of the
individual being, and to pay attention to the desires, tendencies or instincts which
invite him to speak or to act outside his limits. (Simondon 1989b)
21 Depicting interests emerging from work activities, this “creative curiosity,” undermines
the claim to satisfy a pre-existing personality, expressing and contemplating itself in the
mastery of an object. Dewey’s transactional view recasts the very concept of interest by
prioritizing the point of view of the “development of the individual,” that is individuation
over the individual. He seeks to dismantle a “false notion of the relation of interest and
the self” which considers the latter as “fixed antecedent to action,” as “a fixed and hence
isolated  quantity.”  The  development  of  “active  lines  of  interest”  involves,  on  the
contrary, a correlative transformation of people and the world, associating a process of
organization of attention to a: “course of events in which one is engaged and by whose
outcome one is affected” (Dewey 2012: 126). He recalls the etymology of the notion: “The
word interest suggests, etymologically, what is between, – that which connects two things
otherwise distant.”  The idea designates  less  a  state than a  “career,”  i.e.  an effort  at
transformation in which we relate things to “a situation in continuous development,” 
[…] to be interested is to be absorbed in, wrapped up in, carried away by, some
object. To take an interest is to be on the alert, to care about, to be attentive. We say
of an interested person both that he has lost himself in some affair and that he has
found himself in it. Both terms express the engrossment of the self in an object.
22 Through this creation of habits, we inhabit the world.
23 The pragmatist stance helps to meet the limitations of existing approaches that fail to
account  for  this  genesis  of  interests  and  forms  of  life.  In  actor-network  theory,  for
instance, the questioning of the “subject with inwardness” as the origin of action has
brought individuals back into the “mutiplicity that makes them act,” but at the risk of
losing them. In activity theories, the reintegration of the creative and affective dimension
of action fails to discard the traditional notion of subject, and remains dependent upon
the classic semantic of action and its dichotomies – subject/object, ends/means, etc. This
literature (Beguin & Clot 2004; Kaptelini & Nardi 2006: 226) is still infatuated with the
opposition  between  subject-driven  and  context-driven  action,  which  echoes  the
opposition between the interactional view (rationality theory) and the self-actional view
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(normative) among economists, early criticized by Dewey (see Khalil 2003a). Fundamental
preconceptions are involved here. It seems that exploring “the variety of experiences
that people engage in,” and: 
[…] making the person – and particularly the emotional-volitional character of the
person  that  we  recognize  in  desire,  longing  and  joy  –  central,  would  radically
challenge the rationalist assumptions of studies of people and technology in ways
that  Human-Computer  Interaction  (HCI)  and  Computer-Supported  Cooperative
Work (CSCW) may not be ready to do. (McCarthy & Wright 2004)
24 This pragmatist stance has made ecological perspectives flourish (Joseph 2007a; Joseph
2007b; Tracés 2008; Tracés 2012). As regards work, it has allowed for the study of vigilance
(Chateauraynaud 1997), orientation (Boutet 2006; Boutet 2008; Bidet 2008; Bidet 2011a;
Denis, Pontille 2010) and complex information ecologies (Nardi, O’Day 1999; Lahlou 2000),
for a “core-task analysis” in ergonomy (Norros 2004), to mention just a few. The ecology
of perception (Gibson 1979) was in fact already “implicitely pragmatist,” as an affordance
is: “a property that cannot be attributed to the environment, nor to the agent, but to
their  relationship”  (Joseph,  as  quoted  from Breviglieri,  Stavo-Debauge  2007).  Human
agency is  thus inseparable  from a “reticulation” of  space and time at:  “selected key
points.” As the French philosopher Simondon (1989a: 164) puts it: 
The  human  being  finds  himself  connected  to  a  world  experienced  as  an
environment  […]  A  reticulation  of  space  and  time  develops,  that  highlights
privileged places and moments,  as  if  all  man’s  power to act  and all  the world’s
ability to influence him were concentrated in these places and these moments. […]
These points and these moments localize and focus the attitude of the living being
vis-à-vis his environment.
25 Such a perspective invites to pay more attention, beyond interactions, situated meanings
and practices occurring here and now, to the continuous transactions between organisms
and  environments,  and  to  what  these  “intra-actions”  (Suchman  2007)  continuously
produce, besides the making of “social selves” (Simpson 2009; Brassac 2005), of “activity
cultures”  (Barbier  &  Durand  2006;  Gherardi  2006),  of  professional  capabilities
(Zimmermann,  2011),  and  of  innovative  process  in  organizations  (Stark  2009;  Lorino
2013). We assume that this shift in vision from interaction to transaction can illuminate
today’s  work dramas,  both their  most  intimate  and their  most  public  challenges.  As
regards their most intimate challenges, the ethicizing of work shows the vital need of
being a participant and of inhabiting one’s work and how it faces new constraints in labile
and complex environments (4). As regards their most public challenges, work may prove
crucial for cultivating democratic habits (5).
 
The Ethicizing of Work: Workers as Form Seekers
26 We introduced the notion of “true work” (vrai boulot) to point the ethicizing of work and
the correlative involvement in work. This ethicizing happens when we come to value
moments or parts of our work, even scarce (Bidet 2011a). Thus “true work” invites to
describe  how people  try  to  orient  themselves,  especially  within  complex,  labile  and
uncertain  work  environments,  so  as  to  inhabit  them  and  to  turn  working,  despite
everything and at least temporarily, into a meaningful practice. Memory is particularly
attached  to  these  moments,  which  become  sources  of  emotional  attachment,
commitment, and nostalgia,  and which usually feed criticism and professional claims.
Such moments do not mean pure joy. Most of the time, they go hand in hand with long
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lasting  effort  and  attention.  Therefore,  studying  “true  work,”  as  we  did  in  our
investigations on technicians working in a traffic control center platform, calls for both a
situational and a ‘trans-situational’ focus, to grasp how valuations are created during the
course of careers, when experienced moments of felicity (re)invent a relationship with an
activity and its environment. Their valuation can be explicitly stated as such – “here you
have  a  true  end,”  “you  truly  have  something  to  do,”  but  more  frequently  it  is  the
valuations of an agency of some kind, not of a frenetic activity, nor of mirroring oneself
in an object.
27 The notion of “true work” lays stress upon the possible making of valued forms of life,
that is, what work may produce for the workers themselves. Dewey was already much
concerned with experience becoming:  “so dispersed,  so heterogeneous,  that it  hardly
deserves this appellation any longer” (Bidet 2011b). Evocations of work are numerous in
his  writings,  as  has  been emphasized (Donohue 1960;  Hickman 1992;  Garrison 1995).
Occupations, associated with both habits and inquiry, are a fundamental issue for Dewey
(1902: 219): “occupations determine the fundamental modes of activity, and hence control
the formation and use of habit”; 
[…] occupations decide the sets of objects and relations that are important,  and
thereby provide the content or material  of  attention,  and the qualities  that are
interestingly significant. (Dewey 1902: 220)
28 Long before Sennett’s The Craftsman (2008), Burke related Marx’s and Veblen’s approaches
to Dewey’s appraisal of the importance of work. In Permanence and Change, he built upon
Dewey’s: “subtle distinction between what is to a man’s interest and what he is interested
in” (1983:  45)  and refers to his  notion of  “occupational  psychosis” as a “pronounced
character of the mind” (40). He reminds us that what is at stake with this “occupational
psychosis,”  and  “ethicizing  of  work,”  is  nothing  less  than  the  anthropological  urge,
rooted in our biological conditions, of being a participant: 
The men “socialized”  their  specific  patterns  of  interest  by  the  manipulation  of
objective  materials  in  a  way  whereby  the  internal  and  the  external  were
indeterminately fused. (Burke 1983: 215)
29 More precisely, we do so by: 
[…] molding the qualities of our experience, as it sometimes induces us to single out
those aspects of events which immediately reflect our interests, and at other times
it trains our attention upon the selection of such means as will make events reflect
our interests. (Burke 1983: 215)
30 Burke, following Veblen, pays a great deal of attention to the way “such ethical structures
tend to become self perpetuating” (239): when “occupation and morality are integrally
intermingled,” that is: 
[…] when occupation reaches the stage of preoccupation. For we are preoccupied
with  something  which  we  value:  a  woman,  a  business,  a  book.  We  ethicize
something when we act towards it as though it were an intrinsic good. (238)
31 As poets, workers use “weighted words” (liii), that contain “emotional overtones” telling
how we should act toward these objects. And this ethicizing “is probably carried into the
most casual bit of slang” (238). But through this process, our interests are also tested,
revised, and produced partly anew. This point is at the heart of Burke’s discussion of
Veblen’s attention to the way our interests confine our thinking within certain channels.
He describes this confinement, as when: 
[…]  one  tends  to  state  the  problem  in  such  a  way  that  his  particular  aptitude
becomes the “solution” for it. Thus, the young pugilist will so ethicize his fists that
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he tends to simplify a great diversity of human relationships by considering them
capable of treatment in terms of an actual or threatened rap on the chin. (243)
32 But when we attempt to embody our attitude into the full complexity of life, we enter
into a creative process, as it discloses the different orders of recalcitrance; we then make
“discoveries” which are: “nothing other than revisions made necessary by the nature of
the  world  itself.”  Thereby  our  common  desire  to  be  a  participant  –  “man  as
communicant” (xxix) – is always challenged: even “the recurrence of ‘like’ situations is
always accompanied by the introduction of new factors.” If Dewey praised work, provided
it  is  not  reduced  to  pure  labor,  it  is  as  the  set  of  activities  in  which  we  take  into
consideration  the  more  continuously  the  direct  and  indirect  consequences  of  our
activities:  “industrial  arts  are  the  typeforms  of  experience  that  bring  to  light  the
sequential  connections  of  things  with  one  another.”  Burke  points  in  this  sense  the
“synthetic” character of our acts: “each being a new way of putting things together, quite
as each line of a drama is” (215, 254).
33 This ordinary effort to give a form to his own experience deserves all  the more our
attention that, today, forming “an “orientation” by dealing with partial perspectives or
various “occupational psychosis,” gets at the core of work as we have to put up with
increasingly symbolic and relational activities, within networks of artefacts or distant
workers. As work becomes basically an interface work between organizations, activities,
processes,  participants,  standard-setters  or  ever-changing  situations,  it  increasingly
appeals to the human capacity of adaptation, to his plasticity more than his motor force.
Scores of sociological investigations still rely upon an implicit mechanistic vision of work
as an amount of force, an energetic input, a painful and repulsive motor effort. They are
more  eager  to  stress  work’s  “intensification”  than  to  explore  its  growing  intrinsic
heterogeneity. By contrast, gaining deeper insights onto temporal aspects, taking into
account both the dynamics of life courses and the rhythms of activity is necessary to shed
light upon how workers try to create forms, styles, rhythms of their own. This led for
example to describe two valued forms of lives within the same technical work (Bidet
2011a).  These  two  forms  of  life,  departing  widely  from one  another,  are  built  upon
opposite affordances and rhythms, so that we distinguished a ‘watchman’ style and an
‘explorer’ style. Interviews show indeed two vocabularies for that same activity. On the
one hand, the material universe of care of machines; on the other, the electronic world of
IT  interfaces  and  artefacts.  For  the  ‘watchmen’  valued  activities  are  termed  “true
technique,” making and repairing, programming and troubleshooting. They appear to require
a body of knowledge that is likely to guarantee the priority of the technician over the
technical object: “That’s more technical, whereas here, the person who has no knowledge
will be able to work anyway.” The “things which are really worth it” stand “behind” the
abstractions of the control operation. Meanwhile, they succeed to reconfiguring part of
their work into “troubleshooting.” Eschewing an indefinite, costly, and futile exploration,
they thus display motor valuations related to short responses: “you filter the calls, then
done, it  works  like  new!.”  By  contrast,  the  ‘explorers’  associate  “true  work”  with
continuous  research,  a  constant  and  time-consuming  distant  circulation  within  the
telecommunications network. To them, the telephone traffic flow should be constantly
researched to keep in touch and be prepared for any circumstances. Thus the ‘explorers’
are not familiar with porous temporality, the scarce and temporally limited interventions
of the ‘watchmen,’ who in turn look with perplexity at these: “enthusiasts, who are really
into it and will find lots of things to do.” The accounts of explorers readily delve into the
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dynamic of traffic flow, the cumulative snowball effects of which are, for them, the very
site of “true work.” The two groups face in fact the same experimental environment in
different ways. Each of the two vocabularies ethicizes a part of this work. For one group,
the  explicit  reference  to  a  “true  work”  indicates  a  distanced  and  readily  criticized
relationship  to  the  activity,  which  is  discarded  as  being  too  distant  from  “true
technique.” Nevertheless, they also encounter some “true work” in the present, when
they reconfigure their work in “troubleshooting.” A part of the activity is valued; it is
coloured, although too rarely for their taste, by the delights of nostalgia, which we see in
our interviews with mentions of the time when: 
[…] we were all in our machine, maybe it’s stupid, but we had… When you’re in your
machine, it’s like in your car, you pay more attention because it’s yours; we knew
the whole history of the machine, the site’s particularities.
34 Recurrence of the possessive case indicates the comfort of familiarity acquired with an
environment which one has come to “inhabit” over time (Breviglieri 2004).
35 Valuations of “true work” set up a rich though neglected realm of meanings and potential
ties,  above  and  below  the  classical  domain  of  occupational  identities  and  rhetorics.
Because  these  valuations  convey  the  desire  for  a  consistent  and  cumulative  work
experience, “true work” is all the more relevant to depict contemporary work worlds,
their  tests  and their  constraints,  and how they may underwrite,  when tests  become
“existential”  (Boltanski  2009),  radical  criticisms.  Here  the  ethicizing  of  work  already
touches  its  public  dimension.  We  illustrate  now more  precisely  how the  pragmatist
stance,  as  opposed  to  the  somewhat  moralistic  approach  developed  by  symbolic
interactionism, can help to better understand how work can cultivate public perspectives,
and even democratic habits of tolerance.
 
Public Perspectives at Work: Beyond Shared
Perspectives
What we share is not as interesting as what we do
not share 
(Bender on Mikhail Bakhtin, as quoted from
Béguin & Clot 2004)
36 The shift from interaction to transaction can enlighten the very existence of a public
perspective within a work context. To take a step from shared perspectives, the Deweyian
standpoint  on  transaction  benefited  from  Simmel’s  insistence  upon  configurations
implying  three  members,  and  from  Peirce’s  interest  in  the  thirdness.  We  begin  by
assuming  that  this  standpoint  is  necessary  in  order  to  decentre  depiction  from the
traditional  image  of  teamwork  and  to  make  visible  a  mainly  collaborative  and
“knowledge-based”  work  where  workers  confront  a  multiplicity  of  information,  or
patients, or clients, or communication devices, and sometimes all together. To make this
claim, we draw on a study of paediatric emergency care services (Chave 2010). In drawing
this section to a close, we will state how this might pertain to a democratic experience.
37 In the two paediatric emergency care services where observations and interviews were
conducted, the main feature is the coexistence of cooperation and entirely asymmetric
perspectives, not as a moment in the course of sharing perspectives, but as a stabilized
configuration.  What  holds  people  together  does  not  resemble  any  kind  of  emergent
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relationship  or  understanding.  Nevertheless,  we  depict  co-activities.  The  presence  of
another person is acknowledged. Activities are related, entangled, and useful one to the
other, but without any shared understanding. Taking the point of view of the other is not
even an issue. On the contrary, we observed a scarce use of verbal language, rare visual
coordination,  and no focused attention.  One must  even ignore the other in order to
cooperate. It is not a matter of misunderstanding (as in Grosjean 2005), nor of not having
to know each other in order to cooperate. This “practical indifference” is an invisible
work,  but  a  practical  and  positive  one  in  complex  information  ecologies  where
practitioners are likely to fight “to fit experiences together in a unified whole” and to
create a thread of continuity.
38 So we studied forms of what we call  “practical indifference” between actors oriented
toward  the  same  global  object  in  two  paediatric  emergency  care  services.  Most
interactions there are not just between medical workers and patients, but include the
parents, or at least one parent. They form two parallel conducts regarding the patient, so
that  the activity as  collective and centred upon a common motive,  as  articulated by
Engeström’s, relies at the same time upon the co-activity of parents and professionals as
regards the common object patient-file, on the cure for doctors and the care for parents,
to state it simply and approximately. The object of such cooperative activities is indeed
very polymorphic: being a person, a patient, a child, or relative, or a file, according to
whom is considering it. The practitioner can treat at the same time one or four or five
files, each one in a different moment of its trajectory in the centre. So files are taken one
after another but patients are treated sequentially and wait between sequences.
39 Their respective perspectives do not fit. For the doctor, what is at stake is the patient’s
recovery, just as for parents, but it is also making the patient leave the centre, be it to
another service or home to make room for new patients. In a sense, the doctor treats files
first, as it is the file, and comments on the file made by parents, patient, and nurses, that
matters and determines what is to be done. Parents, by contrast, focus upon the child and
are involved in a thick biographical and relational historical continuity. They care for the
child’s  sake,  but  also  for  the  family’s  activities’  continuity,  the  child’s  long-term
potentialities  and  short-term  comfort  and  so  on.  In  a  highly  distributed  context  of
activities, the parents keep things coherent, maintain continuity of the medical course
and stay by the child at all times, and from place to place: they in many ways take care of
the child during these sequences, and they transmit (and reconfigure) the story, past
episodes, and what has been said to them to the next professional. In doing so, they orient
the next decisions, and prevent possible errors or pointless repetition.
40 Nevertheless, there is no sign of care for mutual awareness or shared perspective. On the
contrary, there are sharp contrasts between doctors’ and families’ experiences, emotions,
feelings, practical and affective engagements with the patient. The significance and the
framing of the situation also differ: the parents focus on the injured or sick child, the
doctors focus on the continuity of the service’s activity through the handling of patients.
Far from a team-work, and far from a classical medical relationship, the interactions and
cross-actions in regard to the same patient still articulate two partially joined lines of
activity.  Rhythmically,  this  mutual  indifference  and  limited  mutual  awareness  has
consequences.  When doctors face fresh emergencies,  families stay in the examination
room for longer and longer periods.
41 But surprisingly, this mutual lack of concern for the other group’s activity favours their
co-activity for the patient’s sake. Through forms of practical indifference, invisible work
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done  parallel  to  ones’  actions  can  be  tackled  in  a  way  other  than  as  a  burden  or
prejudicial misrecognition. What is invisible there is the coordination, and what relates
and makes coherent the respective activities,  what builds co-activity with so small  a
relationship between actors. What is invisible, otherwise, is what the other actors are
doing, not because it is hidden, shameful, or understated, but because it is taken to be
unnecessary,  and usefully  ignored.  Through their  permanent  presence and vigilance,
parents  enable  the  doctor  to practice  cuts  in  sequences  that  constitute  an  efficient
solution to treat simultaneously a large number of patients. They enable doctors not to
care about or even remember each and every one at every moment. At the heart of this
sometimes  uncomfortable  indifference  lies  a  form  of  complementarily  and  public
cooperation  or  co-activity  upon  the  same  “runaway  object”  (Engeström),  with  a
heterogeneous, short-term but stabilized community which acts mostly separately and
with minimal accountability.
42 In  a  larger  research  programme  on  multi-activity  at  work,  conducting  fieldwork  in
various sectors and organizational settings, we found similar economies of attention and
mutual practical indifference at the core of co-activities among workers that also deserve
to be documented,  not simply as a lack of cooperation,  but as a new hybrid form of
collective organization through multi-activity and high heterogeneous interactions. The
transactional  view  helps  to  describe  forms  of  coordination  that  depart  from  the
traditional account of the desirable and necessary alignment of perspectives in groups
where doing things together supposedly takes into account each point of view and the
overarching goal, facilitating dialogue and criticism among different views derived from
various  practices,  and  overcoming,  in  some  degree,  the  irreducible  otherness  of
experience.
43 As she studied quite similar working contexts, Grosjean speculated as to whether activity
theory models might offer: 
[…]  a  more  satisfying  framework  [than  situated  action]  to  rethink  issues  of
relevance and mutual intelligibility according to the activity systems [of the various
actors  involved  in  cooperative  work]  when  they  are  not-convergent.  (Grosjean
2005)
44 Despite the early (Garreta 2013) and continued (Norros 2004) influence of pragmatism on
activity theory, we believe that building from the pragmatist stance offers an alternative
path in this direction, highlighting: “the part of shadow collective intelligence at work in
any  cooperative  situation”  (Joseph  2004:  23).  What  we  term  “practical  indifference”
suggests indeed an alternative way to enter the public dimension of micro-interactions
and the mere possibility of a public perspective within a situation. It echoes the Deweyian
point of view on a public dimension that does not necessarily end with community or
shared  perspectives  or  stated  public  problems.  But  it  indicates  a  broader  sense  of
tolerance, a tolerance in co-activity that does not aim at sharing perspectives, and is
consonant  with  the  routine  meeting  of  strangers  –  which  is  becoming  increasingly
important in our digital and knowledge-based worlds of work.
 
Conclusion
45 The pragmatist stance helps to get deeper insights into today’s work dramas: their most
intimate as their most public challenges. To illuminate how ways of doing and living are
created at work, we have to depict workers not primarily as status-seekers, but as seekers
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after style, rhythm, form. We can then examine how they try to find their way in their
everyday context. But it is also a means of progressing from the ethicizing of work to how
it can foster public experience. Both dimensions, the ethicized and the public dimensions
of work, are required to understand how one confronts work dramas.
46 First, the challenge of becoming a participant faces new constraints. In an increasingly
knowledge-based, experimental and cosmopolitan society, work becomes less apparent
since it requires less physical force than adaptability. Work mobilizes increasingly the
strictly human capacity to cope with ever-changing situations and contexts, to move and
negotiate  between  different  perspectives,  and  to  engage  in  distant  and  temporary
interactions within shifting production networks. But how are ethicized forms of lives,
with a minimum of  continuity and homogeneity,  created in such labile  and complex
contexts? What counts on a daily basis for workers? Can we bring out the methods and
the artfulness of their ordinary devices?
47 Second, the growing division of labour means that workplaces and “workspaces” – as
work becomes more also porous,  mobile,  ubiquitous (Borzeix & Cochoy 2008),  depart
increasingly from the work-team figure and its mutual intelligibility or mutual awareness
horizon. Burke expressed early concerns about this trend: “our nomadism, […] our wide
diversification of  occupational  habits.”  A “world of  much occupational  diversity,”  he
feared,  will  turn “the different  classes  of  individuals  in  ‘mysteries’  one for  another”
(1983). Over the past decades, this trend accelerated. But we saw in this article that such a
trend may also foster public experience. Working daily with humans or artifacts that
remain strangers to us can cultivate habits of tolerance (Bidet 2008; Bidet 2011a; Chave
2010; Boutet 2008; Naville 1963; Knorr-Cetina 1997; Kaptelini, Nardi 2006). The remaining
question is under what conditions and with what consequences.
48 More generally, much of the sociological literature is underpinned by outdated pictures
of work – as an energetic input and as a peer group matter (Vatin 1993; Vatin 2008). They
prevent researchers from considering the ethicized and the public dimensions of work. A
pressing task may then be to rephrase work within a new set of symbols and images. As
long as its most common images remain mechanistic, following Charlot in the film Modern
Times (Chaplin  1936),  a  large  range  of  occupations  and  activities,  their  abilities  and
challenges, will  remain outside the public scope, and even perhaps not recognized as
work.
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ABSTRACTS
Is there any reason to advocate for a new momentum in the “practice turn”? This article argues
that the practice turn, already much inspired by pragmatist philosophers, namely Dewey and
Mead, could be enhanced by drawing even more upon pragmatism. We begin with the view that
focal cooperation activities have been an overriding concern among interactionist scholars. We
contend this framework can be broadened by following Dewey’s proposal to shift in vision from
interaction to transaction. It helps indeed taking into consideration a wide range of neglected
but common situations, joint actions, and temporal processes. In particular, we show how the
transactional view can foster the understanding both of the most intimate at work – its ethicizing,
its moral network and personal styles –, and of the most public at work – its public images and
public perspectives. We end up considering the significance of these moves to explore today’s
work dramas and to meet the need to renew our images of work.
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